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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 13-1114 
_________________ 
 
YAN YAN LI, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                 Respondent  
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A093-396-760) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 3, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 3, 2013) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Yan Yan Li (“Li”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ 
denial of her motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
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I. 
In 2008, Yan Yan Li appeared at a removal proceeding before an Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”).  Although Li did not contest the IJ‟s finding that she overstayed her visa in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), she sought withholding of removal on the basis of 
China‟s family planning policy.  The IJ found her testimony lacking in credibility and 
ordered her removal to China.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed in 
mid-2009.  Due to attorney error, Li did not receive notice that her appeal was 
unsuccessful.  Upon her motion, the BIA reissued its decision in December 2010, and we 
denied her subsequent petition for review in Li v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 432 F. App‟x 
137 (3d Cir. 2011).   
More than a year later, Li filed a counseled motion to reopen with the BIA.  She 
stated that she converted to Christianity in 2011, and that the Chinese government had 
increased its persecution of members of unregistered Christian groups between 2008 and 
2011.  In denying her motion, the BIA found that Li‟s evidence neither demonstrated that 
she will suffer persecution upon her return to China, nor established a change in country 
conditions.  Therefore, the BIA determined that Li lacked a basis for filing her motion to 
reopen after the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen had passed.  The BIA further 
declined to exercise its authority to sua sponte reopen Li‟s proceedings.  Through 
counsel, Li filed a timely petition for review.
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 We lack jurisdiction to review the portion of the BIA‟s decision that denied sua sponte 
reopening.  See Pllumi v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we review denials of motions to 
reopen under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
2
  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 
290 F.3d 166, 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  “Discretionary decisions of the BIA will not be 
disturbed unless they are found to be „arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.‟”  Tipu v. 
I.N.S., 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).  A motion filed more than 90 
days after the final decision of the BIA cannot be entertained unless it “is based upon 
changed country conditions proved by evidence that is material and was not available and 
could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  Pllumi v. Att‟y 
Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011).  A renewed asylum application based 
on changes in personal circumstances filed outside of the 90-day window must be 
accompanied by a motion to reopen that successfully shows changed country conditions.  
Liu v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Li does not dispute that her motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after the 
BIA‟s final decision.  Rather, Li asserts that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her 
motion to reopen because it selectively considered the evidence to find that Li failed to 
establish changed country conditions.  We have stated that the BIA is required to 
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 Because we find that the BIA‟s decision was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law, 
we do not reach the BIA‟s alternative determination that Li did not establish a prima facie 
case for asylum relief.  See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 169-70 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating the BIA 
may deny a motion to reopen in asylum cases where it determines that “the movant 
would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief”) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 
U.S. 94, 105 (1988)). 
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consider the evidence of changed country conditions presented by a party, and that the 
BIA “should provide us with more than cursory, summary or conclusory statements, so 
that we are able to discern its reasons for declining to afford relief to a petitioner.”  Zheng 
v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA, 
437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  But it need not “parse or refute on the record each 
individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.”  Id.  Here, the BIA 
reviewed, among other evidence that Li submitted, Li‟s baptism certificate, a letter from a 
church in the United States, and excerpts from U.S. Department of State country and 
International Religious Freedom reports, China Aid Association reports, and research 
articles.  The BIA then cited the 2009 U.S. Department of State country report on China, 
and the 2009 and 2010 International Religious Freedom Reports to support its finding 
that Li‟s evidence was inadequate to establish her eligibility for asylum or demonstrate 
the existence of changed country conditions.
3
   
To the extent that Li argues the BIA erred by failing to find the existence of 
changed country conditions, we find that the BIA‟s determination was reasonable in light 
of the evidence before it.  The 2009 and 2010 International Religious Freedom Reports 
establish that the practice of Christianity in China is restricted to those churches 
registered with the government.  In those years, leaders and members of unregistered 
churches faced detention for activities related to their religious practice.  The BIA 
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 We note that, as the BIA found, Li‟s conversion to Christianity constitutes a change in 
personal circumstances rather than country conditions.  See Liu, 555 F.3d at 150. 
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therefore reasonably concluded that Li did not establish changed country conditions 
sufficient to justify an exception to the time and number limitations on filing a motion to 
reopen.  
After reviewing the record, it does not appear that the BIA‟s decision was 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
